This paper addresses the link between the generation of economic knowledge and economic policy conclusions.
Given this tradition of concern with policy and the policy relevance of international economics, it is surprising how little discussion has focused on the scientific or epistemological status of such policy conclusions. Economists and philosophers of science spend much time debating the status of truth claims generated from theory in the social sciences,
policy prescriptions yet little thought is given to the status of that i'follow" from the theory. Generally such 2 policy conclusions are seen to follow "straightforwardly" from theoretical insights. The move from theory to policy conclusion is perceived as completely natural and thus rarely receives any scrutiny.
This paper is a first step in the analysis of how theoretical Or empirical knowledge is used to validate and support policy conclusions. McCloskey (1991) describes the academic journal article as a "sandwich" in which the introduction and policy conclusions are "the bread" lying on either side of "the meat" of the article. In this paper, to carry the metaphor one step further, I look at what holds the sandwich together. The focus is on the rhetorical practices --that is the types of arguments --used to link theory to policy prescription in international economics.
A survey of the major U.S. academic journals in the field of international trade over the period 1988-1992 reveals a wide variety of such validating practices.
There is a looseness of language and argument in the linking of theory to policy prescription which is in stark contrast with the rigidity of discourse in conventional of economic analysis. This contrast implies that the discourse of mathematical theory and econometrics is "unstable", lacking sufficient persuasive power in the legitimation of international economic policy.
Robert Baldwin puts the distinction in terms perhaps more familiar to economists. He chides trade economists for "using a different model to reach policy conclusions from the one they employ in analyzing most trading situations. The first model is much less formal than the latter..." (Baldwin, 1992, p. 827) . The purpose of this Paper is to analyze in detail the rhetoric of the less formal of these models and to show that this type of model is not an accidental methodological discrepancy, but a necessary modeling strategy for legitimating policy conclusions generated by the more formal type of model. I argue that this methodological discrepancy occurs not because policy conclusions matter so little, but precisely because they are crucial to the legitimation of the field itself.
The Rhetoric of Economics and Contemporary Trade Theory
Two recent developments in economics render unacceptable the passive acceptance of the theory/policy links in international trade research.
The first is the methodological upheaval brought on by McCloskey's (1985) claim that economics is inevitably rhetorical --rooted in argument and persuasion, not any absolute standard.
Rhetorical is not a perjorative term, but embodies the recognition that facts do not make arguments; the arguments are critical. Such arguments entail a variety of strategies and techniques including metaphor, hierarchy of discourse, and appeals to authority.'
According to McCloskey (1990, p. 56 There is now a vast literature of interpretation of economics texts as well as a debate over the methodological implications and importance of McCloskey's "rhetoric of economics". Two excellent collections of articles are Samuels (1990) and Klamer, McCloskey and Solow (1988) . 3 Mayer's (1993) "principle of the strongest link" illustrates this point.
See also McCloskey (1990, p. 73) the cases of Japan and South Korea.
The response to this explanatory failure led to the development of "the new international economics," beginning in the late 1970's.
This new approach stresses economies of scale, imperfect competition, and strategic interaction among rival firms and governments, and has increasingly provided a rational basis for phenomena previously unexplained by neoclassical thought.4 While solving some important problems, the new international economics has created dilemmas of its
In particular, by devising theoretical models in which selective trade protection (so-called "strategic trade policy") is welfare- In similar fashion, Lapan (1988) states:
We have shown that if production lags are present and tariff precommitment is not feasible, then the time-consistent tariff equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the precommitment equilibrium, and the second-best solution will include a production tax on importables.
Less modest, but equally true to the model, Grossman and Helpman (1990) It is on this premise that international economists can claim a "rational basis" for economic policy, since there is no truth or relevance claim beyond the logic of the rational choice model. In this view, the purpose of economics is simply to state the "implications" of neoclassical theory, with the implicit assumption that the setting of the "real world" will not affect these implications. They then test the model using regressions and simulation. Note that most empirical studies of policy relevance follow an approach Of simple empirics, described below. With the use of stylized facts and broad characterizations of behavioral processes, they move, without transition, to a discussion of "policymakersUU, who:
III. HC!asual Empirics
persuaded by the conventional wisdom, are inclined to use tariffs (1988) appeal explicitly to "casual empiricism."
The language of Casual Empirics is such that it may be difficult to determine if it is the model or the observed world that is being discussed. Gruenspecht (1988) , for example, admits the "practical" difficulties in operationalizing his model and then asserts:
These difficulties should not obscure the message that the availability of a current cost antidumping standard changes the behavior of both domestic and foreign firms in internationally competitive industries where learning is important. This impact is likely to be pernicious from both a national and world welfare
Pespective where the markets under consideration are roughly 'parallel' in terms of market size, production cost and concentration.
The implication is that this is a practical, policy relevant, claim.
The move from theoretical result to actual policy relevance is almost invisible.
Casual Empirics also includes the illusionism of language, in which care is taken to phrase the theoretical model in terms of realistic categories, such as the use of MNorth-South" in some models For an analysis of illusionism and how it works in an early article in the new international economics, see Milberg (1988) . The case invokes the caveat that the results "can be misused in practice." (Panagariya, 1992) .* Often, Modesty cases (a) and (b) are used in tandem. Clemenz (1990) states his theoretical results that free trade may not be optimal for attaining desired R&D levels and then asserts that "this conclusion has to be treated with care," because the model is partial equilibrium (case (a)) and because rather surprisingly, optimal temporary protection can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium... In this 8 Krugman (1992, p. 429 ) describes his UUmodel" of GATT behavior (" GATT-think") as 'Ia simple set of principles that is entirely consistent, explains most of what goes on in negotiations, but makes no sense in terms of economics."
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It is of note that when free trade yields optimality in theory, there is never discussion of treating the results "with care." See Dixit (1986) . equilibrium, the government's payoff is smaller than the first best outcome, due to its inability to make a credible commitment.
He then begins a list of caveats, admitting the model's narrow treatment of the state:
However, I do not mean to say that the government cannot make a credible commitment to the future liberalization in reality.
There are several possibilities which the liberalization qame fails to take into account. First, the qovernment miqht be aware of "the demonstartion effect" of liberalization... Second, the qovernments miqht be able to sign a contract with a third party Important here is that the policy conclusion has no explicit root in a rational-choice framework.
Empirics Only is often used in cases where the theoretical hypothesis is already well established in the literature. Noland (1989) , for example, verbally states the argument for the J-curve effect and then moves quickly to the econometrics. He concludes with a simple reporting of the regression estimates and the following policy conclusion:
The estimates reported in this paper indicate that if policymakers wish to target the trade balance, policies which affect the level of economic activity would be more effective than those which operate through the exchange rate.
Under the Empirics Only mechanism, policy relevance depends on the relation to policy of the empirical test, and is established with the simpie reporting of empirical results. Dinopoulos and Kreinen (1988) , for example, conclude their article as follows:
In 1982, the total social cost of the VER was put at $4 billions and the VER saved an estimates 22,358 jobs. This works out to an annual cost of $181,000 per job saved -a multiple of the average annual compensation of U.S. auto workers.
Sometimes Empirics Only is used for hypotheses that do not have a strong microfoundation, choice theoretic basis, even in the pure theory literature. On occasion the hypotheses tested are developed using simple accounting identities or general functional forms, and thus are immediately translated to regression models (e.g. Audretsch and Yamawaki, 1988) . Often they are simply stated as having a tradition in the literature (e.g. Dinopoulos and Kreinin, 1988) . That is, the hypothesis may be well-established on optimization grounds or not. The key is that a verbal rendition of the hypothesis is sufficient to justify moving on quickly to empirical testing.
I have also divided those articles which have no direct policy relevance between those containing only theoretical content (No Policy -Theory) and those using empirical analysis as well (No PolicyEmpirics) . These are entered as rhetorica. practices VI and VII in the results reported below.
Survey Results
The survey included four major U.S. academic journals containing articles on international trade --The American Economic Review ( The data are presented in summary form in Table 1 This is apparently not unique to international trade research. Discussing macroeconomics, Lucas (1980) described the role of theory as the "provision of fully articulated, artificial economic systems that can serve as laboratories in which policies that would be prohibitively expensive to experiment with in actual economies can be tested out at much lower cost." Note that this result should send a warning to those calling for more "policy-oriented" training in graduate economics education as a way of introducing more realism and "real world" applications (JEL, 1991) . The implications of the survey presented here are that greater emphasis on policy would, ceteris paribus, raise the percentage of graduate training devoted to theory. Morgan (1988) presents some evidence that empirical analysis may be gaining favor in the major academic journals. Learner (1991, p. 216) argues that the lack of influence of empirical research in international economics is due, in part, to the low quality of the empirical work. He notes that "There are many examples of work in international economics in which the translation of theory into an empirical exercise was casual and 'intuitive,' and which were later discovered to have been fatally flawed." In short, the value of the policy conclusions, and more generally of the knowledge generated in such articles is based on the reader's acceptance of the "economyI' depicted in the model. As Summers (1991, pp. 144-45) states:
I suspect that there is a meta-theorem that any policy recommendation can be derived from some model of optimizing behavior... If empirical testing is ruled out, and persuasion is not attempted, in the end I am not sure these theoretical exercises teach us anything at all about the world we live in.
Mechanisms I and II do less than the other mechanisms in quelling such skepticism.
The new international economics in its early days relied heavily Krugman (1986) . where the realism of the model's assumptions is defended. In this event, the author might not feel obligated to restate such a defense when stating his policy conclusions. The new international economics shows an ambivalence towards the realism of assumptions. On the one hand, the models are said to contain more realism than the old international economics. On the other hand, the (interventionist) policy conclusions which logically follow from these models are discounted because they lack the generality of more conventional tension in the rhetorical approach insist that the question of realism (1988).
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Thus the new international models. Note that there is also a to economics itself, which would is impossible to gauge.
See Maki economics represents a degenerate research program in the sense of Lakatos. According to Diesing (1991, p. 461, II.. .degenerating research programs do not predict new facts or produce new theories, but concentrate on adjusting their theories to events after they have happened." Bensel and Elmslie (19921, it should be noted, come to a different conclusion, arguing that most of the new international economics is neither degernerative nor progressive. The fact that this methodology is so seldom used indicates that one must put stereotypes aside to understand how policy relevance is established in contemporary research-l6
The high incidence of Casual Empirics as a rhetorical device is best understood by considering how economics argument persuades.
While the analysis itself must follow very strict logical rules, the analytical framework, because of its narrowness, may preclude convincing links to institutions, policies and histories. Casual The sample of JPE articles is too small to draw conclusions of this nature, although it shows a pattern more similar to the AER than the JIE. Rhetorical devices are the ways by which economists argue a theory's relevance --that is, establish the legitimacy of their la The diversity and looseness of the rhetoric of policy relevance found in our survey is further evidence of the oft-noted divergence between the methodology economists preach and the one they practice (Blaug, 1980 , Caldwell, 1982 and Beed, 1991 . International economists continue to insist that they do and should continue to practice science along logical positivist lines, as evidenced by Rassekh and Thompson's (1993) recent call for more empirical testing of the factor price equalization theorem in order to enhance its "scientific status". The usefulness of normative trade theory depends on the readiness with which governments take the advice of economists who are trained in, and apply this body of theory. The difficulty is that often the arguments of economists have "fallen on stony ground". diverse than those of economists publishing in the four journals we surveyed, since the latter includes almost exclusively the work of neoclassical economists.
A third view is that policy conclusions matter so much they cannot be left merely to the logic of optimization theory. The Empirics shows that this is also true of econometrics argumentation.
Weintraub (1991) has referred to this as evidence of the "instability" of such discourse. The instability of general equilibrium analysis has been located in its axiomatic roots, its "Procrustean tendencies" (Coddington, 1979) and most recently in its careful construction in the history of economic thought (Weintraub, 1991) . The tenuous stability of econometrics discourse can be attributed to the acknowledged vagueness of most translations of theory into empirical test (Learner, 19911 , an awareness of the pervasiveness of data mining (Learner, 1983, Caudill, 19871 , the difficulty of replication (Dewald, et al., 1986) and the relatively wide variation in the estimated value of many "historical constants" (Mirowski, 1992) . Raising the policy relevance of international economics may require a reformulation of the conventional definition of rigor.
